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Abstract Traditionally, interdisciplinarity has been taken to require conceptual or the-
oretical integration. However, in the emerging field of sustainability science this kind of
integration is often lacking. Indeed sometimes it is regarded as an obstacle to interdisci-
plinarity. Drawing on examples from sustainability science, we show that problem-feeding,
i.e. the transfer of problems, is a common and fruitful-looking way of connecting disparate
disciplines and establishing interdisciplinarity. We identify two species of problem-feed-
ing: unilateral and bilateral. Which of these is at issue depends on whether solutions to the
problem are fed back to the discipline in which the problem originated. We suggest that
there is an interesting difference between the problem-feeding approach to interdisci-
plinarity and the traditional integrative perspective suggested by among others Erich
Jantsch and his colleagues. The interdisciplinarity resulting from problem-feeding between
researchers can be local and temporary and does not require collaboration between
proximate disciplines. By contrast, to make good sense of traditional integrative inter-
disciplinarity we must arguably associate it with a longer-term, global form of close,
interdisciplinary collaboration.
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1 Interdisciplinarity: A Traditional Perspective
One day you are in, and the next you are out. The term ‘interdisciplinarity’ passes in and
out of fashion. However, the phenomenon itself is associated with fundamental issues in
science and philosophy.
Philosophers of science who have studied interdisciplinarity, whether or not they deploy
the term itself, often focus on relationships obtaining between proximate disciplines or
fields. For instance, since the 1970s the life sciences have been a prime source of material,
and numerous case studies have been made showing how our knowledge can grow, and
how discoveries can be made, when fields such as biochemistry and cell biology interact.
However, interdisciplinary collaboration can involve less proximate disciplines as well.
This is one reason why we want to look more closely, from a philosophy of science
perspective, at a new kind of interdisciplinary case, namely sustainability science.
The other reason for focusing on sustainability science is this. It is not clear that
traditional accounts of interdisciplinarity capture a certain type of interdisciplinary col-
laboration that we believe is characteristic of sustainability research: the transfer of
problems (and sometimes solutions) from one discipline to the other. We call this type of
interdisciplinarity ‘problem-feeding’.
This article starts by presenting the traditional perspective and the difficulties it has
handling the interdisciplinary field of sustainability science. Then we introduce the notion
of problem-feeding and compare it with recent discussion of the philosophy of interdis-
ciplinarity. We discuss two varieties of problem-feeding: unilateral and bilateral. Which of
these is at issue depends on whether solutions to the problem are fed back to the discipline
in which the problem originated.
Since the early 1970s, and certainly since the publication of Jantsch’s (1970/1972), the
type and degree of conceptual or, broadly speaking, theoretical integration of the partic-
ipating disciplines has been the primary basis on which to sort types of interdisciplinary
encounter. This focus on conceptual or theoretical relationships defines what might be
called the traditional perspective on interdisciplinarity.
Figure 1 illustrates the traditional view. Jantsch characterizes multidisciplinarity in
terms of ‘‘no cooperation’’, interdisciplinarity in terms of ‘‘coordination by higher-level
concept’’, and transdisciplinarity in terms of ‘‘multilevel coordination of entire education/
innovation system’’. At other places he writes about multidisciplinarity as a situation with a
variety of disciplines whose relationships have not been made explicit. The kinds of
relationship he and others belonging to the traditional perspective are talking about, then,
are conceptual or theoretical relationships.
Often multidisciplinarity is still understood as non-integrative, or additive, amounting
merely to the juxtaposition of knowledge claims from different sources; correspondingly,
interdisciplinarity is quite frequently thought to involve more ‘internal’ integration than
multidisciplinary approaches do (Klein, 1990, 56–58).
An additional feature of Jantsch’s approach is ‘‘the basic evolutionary ladder’’ (Jantsch
1970/1972, 15). Collaboration may start as multidisciplinary and end as transdisciplinary.
The three categories we referred to in Fig. 1 are steps for climbing up the basic evolu-
tionary ladder. Many advocates of the traditional perspective have a similar view. For
instance, Jantsch observes that another influential writer on interdisciplinarity, Piaget,
conceives of inter- and transdisciplinarity as the two highest steps ‘‘on a rigid ladder of
levels’’ (ibid., 18). What happens in the step Jantsch calls interdisciplinary is especially
important. With this step:
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A common axiomatics for a group of related disciplines is defined at the next higher
hierarchical level, thereby introducing a sense of purpose. (Jantsch 1970/1972, 16)
Jantsch’s view that the interdisciplinary step necessarily introduces an effective sense of
purpose is somewhat less widely shared, and therefore it should not be included in the
traditional perspective. The sense of purpose allows us to answer the question
‘‘interdisciplinarity to what end?’’ and influences the disciplines. In Jantsch’s view, with
the introduction of interdisciplinary relations the linked scientific disciplines change in
respect of their concepts, structures, and aims.
Transdisciplinarity is then taken to involve massive coordination on the basis of a
generalized axiomatics. Jantsch’s idea is that several (two-level) interdisciplinary systems
are linked, and that changes in overall system goals have an impact on concepts and
principles throughout all of the linked, interdisciplinary scientific disciplines. If we bracket
Jantsch’s insistence on change being effected from above, his conception of transdiscip-
linarity is part of the traditional perspective. For instance, in Apostel et al. (1972, 25f)
transdisciplinarity is defined as the ordering of disciplines under a common set of axioms.
Jantsch’s idea that interdisciplinary collaboration evolves from multidisciplinarity to
transdisciplinarity is clearly visible in contemporary thinking about interdisciplinary sci-
ence, and in particular in sustainability science. Consider, for example, the terms in which
a quite large Swedish research programme, Lund University Centre of Excellence for
Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability (LUCID), explains how
collaboration within the programme will develop over a period of 10 years (Fig. 2).
At its inception, in 2008, LUCID engaged researchers from seven disciplines and four
faculties. Although the researchers were officially working on joint research problems,
such as land-use change, the problems were approached from each individual’s
Transdisciplinarity: multilevel coordination…
Interdisciplinarity: coordination by higher-
level concept
Multidisciplinarity: no cooperation
Fig. 1 The traditional
perspective. Source Figure
adapted from Jantsch (Jantsch
1970/1972, 15)
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disciplinary perspective. A few years have passed since 2008, and according to the plan the
current interdisciplinary phase will be ‘‘resulting in a co-evolution of theories for sus-
tainability science’’; finally, in the transdisciplinary phase, ‘‘theories evolve and mature to
gradually incorporate more domains and transcend the boundary between science and
practice’’ (Jerneck et al. 2011, 79). The conceptual, or theoretical, integration in the
interdisciplinary phase is reminiscent of the picture painted by Jantsch. The assumption
that the programme could not move forward at a faster pace probably accords with
common sense. Integration by higher-level concepts and theories takes time. If such
integration is needed for ‘higher’ levels of interdisciplinarity, such as transdisciplinarity, to
develop, higher levels of interdisciplinary collaboration plausibly occur after less advanced
ones.
We deploy sustainability science as a test case against which accounts of interdisci-
plinarity can be evaluated. It clearly merits consideration in its own right. We also think it
can be used to assess perspectives such as Jantsch’s. Sustainability science raises inter-
disciplinary issues of a kind Jantsch would surely have wanted to be able to account for:
‘‘In most general terms, the purpose of the university may be seen in the decisive role it
plays in enhancing society’s capability for continuous self-renewal’’ (Jantsch 1970/1972, 12).
Given this, the field of sustainability science cannot be said to be unrepresentative in the
traditional perspective.
2 The Need for an Alternative to the Traditional Perspective
Despite its somewhat unusual amplification of a sense of purpose as an essential com-
ponent of interdisciplinarity, Jantsch’s account might appeal to many philosophers of
science. Its focus on integration by concept or theory is well-known from the unity of
science movement, from Nagelian reductionism (Nagel 1961), and from other less
reductionist accounts. We discuss some of the modern varieties of this view in Sect. 7
below. In this section we highlight two problems with the traditional perspective.
(2a) Pretty clearly, the traditional perspective is threatened by Jantsch’s treatment of the
basic evolutionary ladder. It begins to look like a rather ineffective tool for characterizing
interdisciplinary collaborations of shorter duration. Sustainability projects aimed at prac-
tical problem-solving are frequently of this type. The traditional perspective becomes
incapable of discriminating between shorter projects, evaluating them all as
Multi Inter Trans
Ten years
Fig. 2 Interdisciplinarity over time. Source Figure adapted from Jerneck et al. (2011, 79)
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multidisciplinary endeavours involving no cooperation, when surely these collaborations
might differ in ways that a philosophy of interdisciplinarity wants to be able to account for.
As a potential counterexample to Jantsch’s and our view (that traditional interdisci-
plinarity takes plenty of time to establish), it should be noted that there is at least one
popular account of transdisciplinarity in which Jantsch’s conceptual and theoretical inte-
gration is assumed to take place in the absence of previous stages of interdisciplinary
collaboration. Michael Gibbons and Helga Nowotny and their colleagues attracted con-
siderable attention by claiming that modern science often involves transdisciplinary
knowledge generation in ‘‘Mode 2’’ (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001). The Mode
2 concept is designed to suit enquiries in which researchers from different disciplinary
perspectives come together to work on problems ‘‘a context of application.’’ The Mode 2
concept of transdisciplinarity deployed here is similar to Jantsch’s concept of transdis-
ciplinarity in many ways, but it does not contain his additional assumption that before
(Mode 2) transdisciplinarity the research team first spends time in less integrated forms of
interdisciplinary collaboration. Instead, a possibly unique theoretical framework is gen-
erated from scratch, partly as a result of negotiations in rather heterogeneous, local
research groups.
Does the Mode 2 account encourage confidence in the idea that the traditional per-
spective on interdisciplinary research can be successfully applied to projects of shorter
duration, and to more practically oriented projects as well? Not really. What it establishes
is merely that there is no contradiction involved in assuming that interdisciplinary research
can be integrated by a theoretical framework that has been designed and agreed upon in a
local interdisciplinary context. But examples of Mode 2 projects in sustainability science
that are both practically oriented and result in new theoretical frameworks are rare.
Whether or not one believes in the basic evolutionary ladder, this already suggests the
need for a complementary account of interdisciplinarity—one that does not build on
integration by concept or theory.
(2b) The case of sustainability science highlights an independent shortcoming, or
potential shortcoming at any rate, of the traditional account of interdisciplinarity. Some
sustainability scientists who are committed to the long-term project do not regard them-
selves as promoters of integration by concept or theory. For instance, responding to a
questionnaire, a senior research scientist from a European centre for sustainable devel-
opment research wrote to us:
We don’t use the label ‘sustainability science’, since we define ourselves primarily as
focusing on themes, but from different disciplinary backgrounds. We are very cau-
tious about defining our work and approach as being part of a new discipline, since
this closes off doors that need to remain open for inter- and transdisciplinarity.
On our interpretation, the response conveys two things of importance. The first is that the
background disciplines the research scientist is thinking of will not themselves be
theoretically integrated as a result of the thematic work. As some areas of sustainability
research illustrate, it is easy to locate contexts of interdisciplinary collaboration which are
unlikely ever to involve integration ‘‘by higher-level concept’’—contexts, moreover, in
which time is not the issue. Certain disciplines are rather rigid, in the sense that they are
unlikely to change conceptually or theoretically (Jantsch 1970/1972, 19), especially as a
result of interdisciplinary collaboration. Many reasons for rigidity can be identified
(Persson and Sahlin 2013, Ch. 10). One possibility is that a powerful disciplinary matrix is
already in place (Kuhn 1969/1970) within one, or both, of the involved disciplines—
effectively blocking theoretical integration of the pair. And in some cases the conceptual
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distance might simply be too big for such integration to be possible (e.g. see Edlund et al.
1986, 24). Thus, one might wonder whether the integration of natural and social
dimensions of sustainability could ever mean that the natural and social sciences should be
conceptually or theoretically integrated. This is the factual problem. Conceptual or
theoretical integration of distant or rigid disciplines is unlikely.
In such cases are we then forced to conclude that we are at a stage of multidisciplinarity,
i.e. in a context with no cooperation? Various things might happen even if the existing
natural and social sciences do not change. For instance, new disciplines are sometimes
born. This is the second, and the main, worry expressed in the quotation. The National
Science Foundation has inherited the slogan Today’s interdisciplinarity, tomorrow’s dis-
ciplinarity. This is what the research scientist we have quoted wants to avoid. She sees a
normative problem with this alternative. Sustainability research should not lead to a new
discipline: a distinct theoretical and conceptual framework might weaken the interdisci-
plinary character of the field. But there is a factual problem with the idea as well. For if
sustainability science emerges as a new discipline, will it integrate concepts and theoretical
fragments from, say, political science and oceanography? Again, the conceptual distance
between the two background theories might simply be too great to allow such integration.
As our case study, sustainability science, shows, a complementary perspective is
required if we are to understand interdisciplinary collaboration in contexts where coordi-
nation by higher-level concepts does not take place. This paper aims to develop this
perspective.
3 Two Examples from Sustainability Science
Sustainability science is a fairly young field. It was consolidated as an international science
policy project in the preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg in 2002 (Jerneck et al. 2011, 70). We want to present two examples with a
bearing on sustainability issues—one contemporary, the other from a time well before the
birth of sustainability science.
(3a) In sustainability science problems are frequently defined by natural sciences and
then exported to social science. This is because sustainability challenges are often iden-
tified initially by the natural sciences and subsequently communicated to society as
potential (future) events or states of the world that will cause societal problems that we
have not met with before. In an influential paper in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) Timothy Lenton et al. (2008)
defined and identified a number of climatic tipping elements (and a few tipping points).
These tipping elements are components of the earth’s climate system which, once
pushed across a certain threshold, or tipping point, are likely to exhibit non-linear, dis-
ruptive change. The PNAS text lists 15 policy-relevant tipping elements, including Arctic
summer sea-ice, the Greenland ice sheet, Atlantic thermohaline circulation, and the Indian
summer monsoon.
The authors argue that these elements can be pushed by human interaction across a
tipping point resulting in Arctic sea-ice loss, the melting of the Greenland ice sheet,
Atlantic deep water formation, Indian monsoon chaotic multi-stability, and so on. Fur-
thermore, every element contributes significantly to human welfare as we know it today.
In many cases the identification of these tipping points clearly falls within the domain of
one or other of the natural science disciplines, or an aggregate of them. Lenton et al. (2008)
focus exclusively on tipping elements that trigger a qualitative change taking place within
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an ‘‘ethical time horizon’’ (revolving around the idea that events or states should not be too
distant in time to be politically significant). However, even with this commitment to
societal issues the task of identifying such events or states does not require real interdis-
ciplinary engagement. On the other hand, this is as far as natural science seems to get—
initially—in approaching the societal dimension. For instance, the task of addressing the
issues of mitigation or adaptation is first and foremost one for social science.
Other problems that Lenton and his colleagues consider are more specific and hinge on
the applicability of their own notion of a tipping element. For instance, they are interested
in the question whether tipping elements in the social-economic system can be identified.
(3b) Scientific investigation of the carbon cycle and its role in climate change has been
of interest for a long time now. Before the 1950s research concentrated on the question
whether changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations explained the occurrence of ice-ages.
However, since then sustainability issues have often been in focus. Nowadays, mapping
out the way carbon cycles through the earth system is a highly interdisciplinary affair
involving physics, chemistry, ecology, biology and economics. Towards the end of the
nineteenth century, however, the carbon cycle and the temperature effects of CO2 were the
concern of physicists. We select one of the most important breakthroughs in this line of
research as our illustration.
CO2 was known to have ‘greenhouse’ properties early on. Both Joseph Fourier, in the
1820s, and John Tyndall, in the 1860s, had been interested in the properties of the gas (see
Weart 2003, 2007), and as early as 1896 Arrhenius produced a quantitative model of the
impact of different atmospheric concentrations of CO2 on the mean surface temperature of
the earth. His results suggested that doubling the concentration of CO2 would result in
mean temperatures rising by approximately 5–6 C.
If CO2 concentrations had indeed varied to this extent, those variations would poten-
tially have explained why ice ages occur. However, it was not known whether such
variation was possible. Arrhenius’ model had not included the role of the oceans in CO2
dynamics. At the time this role was not well understood. It was known that plain water
dissolves CO2, so there was a suspicion that the variability of atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration was comparatively low. It was thought possible that any increase would quickly be
neutralised, as the oceans would absorb the surplus. Arrhenius himself notes this possibility
in the 1896 paper in which his model is formulated. His suspicion was widely retained for
the next five decades.
In 1957 Craig (1957, 2) noted that the range of ‘‘[r]ecent estimates of the residence time
of a molecule of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, before entering the sea, range from 16 h
(Dingle 1954) to the order of 1,000 years’’ (Plass 1956) (see also Weart 1997). In other
words, in 1957 it was not known if the oceans’ absorptive properties would cancel out
increases in CO2 concentrations within a timeframe ensuring that CO2 was not a cause of
climate change.
Against this background a central problem became that of understanding how CO2
cycles through the atmosphere and the oceans. Improved knowledge of the absorptive
properties of the oceans—especially—would shed light on the mechanisms governing the
variability of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. An understanding of this would not
only be essential to the solution of the old problem of the occurrence of ice ages. It would
help to explain the potential dangers of emitting large quantities of fossil carbon into the
atmosphere.
The first, and perhaps most vital, step towards a solution to this problem was provided
by two researchers at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, California. One
of them, the oceanographer Roger Revelle, was the head of the institute. The other, Hans
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Su¨ess, was a chemist and specialist in carbon dating. In 1957 they published a joint paper
in which they calculate the average time a CO2 molecule spends in the atmosphere.
Towards the end of the paper they note that they have used a simplified model of the ocean.
They argue that this simplification is likely to affect their results as a consequence of two
interconnected mechanisms. One concerns the chemical properties of the oceans; the other
has to do with their mechanical properties. First, oceans act as so-called buffer solutions.
They will resist changes in pH such as those induced by the absorption of CO2. In the
surface water two equilibrium reactions realise this mechanism. One is between aqueous
carbon dioxide and carbonic acid (H2CO3); the other is between carbonate ions (CO3
2-)
and bicarbonate ions (HCO3
-). As CO2 is dissolved in oceanic water these equilibrium
reactions are affected. The result is that even if most of the CO2 is initially dissolved, it will
be evaporated right back into the atmosphere. An increase in the CO2 content of the
atmosphere of 10 % is balanced by as little as a 1 % in the total CO2 content of the ocean
(Bolin and Eriksson 1959, 131). This brings us to the second mechanism. Revelle and
Su¨ess (1957) treat the ocean as ‘‘one well-mixed reservoir of CO2’’. This assumption is
problematic, they note, as the oceans are layered. While oceanic water mixes quite quickly
in the horizontal dimension within layers, it mixes excruciatingly slowly between them.
Our current understanding is that the vertical mixing of layers is a process that takes
place over millennia. The implication is that oceans, in the short and medium term, do not
act to dissolve CO2 in any important way. Hence the oceans do not balance CO2 con-
centrations in the atmosphere over relevant timeframes, nor do they preclude CO2 from
playing a role in climate change.
One way to interpret this piece of history is as follows. The task here was to provide an
account of how the oceans function with respect to CO2. To provide such an account two
mechanisms on different scales needed to be coupled. One of these mechanisms belonged
to the domain of oceanography, and the other belonged to chemistry. The role of the oceans
could not be modelled until knowledge from oceanography and chemistry had been
integrated.
Now, both cases we have presented involve the exporting of problems, but in the second
case that export is only part of the story. What is equally, or more, important in the CO2
example is the importing of solutions. This process of involving more and more disciplines
in the importing of solutions has continued. Notably, biological material provides a
gigantic reservoir of carbon offering opportunities for a range of life science disciplines to
contribute to our understanding of the CO2 cycle.
4 Interdisciplinary Types, and Kinds of Interdisciplinary Relata
We began by presenting the traditional perspective. The interdisciplinary stories we have
just told about sustainability science would perhaps have been judged as narratives in
which there is no cooperation of the Jantschian sort. In the first case, (3a), real interdis-
ciplinary engagement is not even required. In the second case, (3b), there is clearly
cooperation, but it is cooperation without coordination by new higher-level concepts.
However, in the traditional perspective as we have presented it coordination by higher-
level concept is crucial, and therefore neither of our two sustainability examples qualifies
as a case of interdisciplinarity as that has traditionally been conceived. At the same time
both examples are clearly interdisciplinary in another sense, and a satisfactory account of
interdisciplinarity should recognize this.
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Before we introduce our own suggestion as to how to understand interdisciplinarity in
(3a) and (3b) we want briefly to take note of the fact that a conception of interdisciplinarity
more pluralistic than one focusing exclusively on coordination by concept or theory is
implicit in many traditional accounts. For instance, Apostel et al. (1972, 25) speak of
(advanced forms of) interdisciplinarity as activities involving the integration of concepts,
methodology, procedures, epistemology, terminology and data. So the traditional per-
spective recognizes additional kinds of interdisciplinary relata.
It is possible, of course, to be more relaxed than Jantsch about what type of constituent
is the more fundamental for climbing the basic evolutionary ladder. Facilitating Inter-
disciplinary Research characterizes interdisciplinary research in a much more relaxed way
as a mode of research that:
integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories
from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fun-
damental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the scope
of a single discipline or area of research practice. (National Academy of Sciences
et al. 2005, 39)
An alternative approach to the traditional one would be to bring order to the often muddled
picture we have of interdisciplinarity by sorting interdisciplinary projects, or aims, by the
types of constituent that interact in encounters between researchers of the disciplines
involved (Thore´n and Persson 2011). The types of constituent stated in Apostel et al.
(1972) and (National Academy of Sciences et al. 2005) could indeed provide the starting
point for such an endeavour. However, before we begin sorting interdisciplinary kinds by
the types of constituent suggested in lists such as those above, we might ponder whether
they are exhaustive, or whether any salient types of constituent are missing.
5 Transfer of Problems
Our conception of interdisciplinary research in this article is pluralistic, but it is not
identical with the conceptions we touched upon in the last section. For one thing, we
invoke a type of constituent not mentioned in the passage excerpted above. We also make
use of a relation other than integration. We do not challenge the idea that the traditional
perspective is sometimes applicable. We simply deny that it always is.
Let us look back at the two examples involving sustainability issues—the tipping-points
and the CO2 cycle. What we claim to be one important feature these two cases have in
common is that problems in them are moved from one discipline to another. Lenton et al.
(2008) can be taken as typical of a development within sustainability science that has been
going on for a decade or more. Many of the initial results concerning the impacts of climate
change have been delivered by various natural science disciplines. New problems have
been created by these results, many of which do not appear to be natural science problems
at all. Some, of course, are quite simply practical problems for the political and social
institutions involved, but many are scientific problems. The impacts of climate change can
only partly be understood from the perspective of climate science. Sea-level rise, or drastic
changes in the weather patterns, will alter the conditions under which our social structures
have been formed. This will obviously affect those structures, but how? What will happen
to people living in areas that slowly become less habitable? Arrhenius was interested in the
impact of climate change on human societies. He thought a warmer climate would result in
better agriculture and a more pleasant and easier life, especially for poor northerners.
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Lenton and colleagues wonder about how to prevent us from passing the tipping points.
But these questions and problems are transferred to sciences better capable of researching
them. The problem-feeding character of interdisciplinarity might be especially clear in
sustainability science, with its focus on how new social problems emerge as a result of
changes in the natural world. The examples from Lenton and his colleagues are of this
type.
5.1 Unilateral Problem-Feeding
Problem-feeding in sustainability science is sometimes unilateral. It is problem-feeding, as
it were, without solution-feeding. In general, one field (or discipline) may rely on another
as a source of problems; these problems may or may not be problems for the discipline in
which the problem originally emerged. To shift to an almost trivial example, consider the
relationship between philosophy of science and science. Clearly the philosophy of, say,
physics, relies on physics (the discipline) for some of its problems. What happens in
physics is part of the subject matter of philosophy of physics. However, the problems may
not be problems for physicists, and their resolution may have negligible impact on the way
physicists conduct their research. We do not mean to take any particular stance on this
question. We simply highlight the fact that if one discipline relies on another for its
problems—in full, or in part—this does not necessarily mean that the discipline from
which problems are generated is affected by this transfer.
A similar point has been made by Grantham (2004, 143), who argues in favour of the
importance of heuristic dependence, i.e. the notion that ‘‘theories and/or methods of a field
can guide the generation of new hypotheses in a neighbouring field’’. Grantham does not
highlight the potentially asymmetric nature of the connection. He is interested in another
issue, namely that unification between disciplinary fields increases with the number of
ways in which two fields are connected. He argues that heuristic dependence is one way in
which unification increases. On his conception, then, unilateral problem-feeding should
also increase unification, and thus potentially establish interdisciplinarity.
We think that the potentially unilateral character of problem-feeding is of special
importance in sustainability science. Here we can reconsider Lenton and the tipping-points.
Identifying tipping-points falls within the boundaries of Lenton’s competence and aca-
demic interest. But identifying effective measures of adaptation or mitigation does not. In
that sense, Lenton’s work can be conceived as a case of problem-feeding without solution-
feeding. The example shows that unilateral problem-feeding can be established on the basis
merely of rather weak relationships already in place between the disciplines or fields.
5.2 Bilateral Problem-Feeding
The CO2 example contains more bilateral problem-feeding as well: problem-feeding with
solution-feeding. In the case of CO2 it was known in Arrhenius’ time that the absorptive
properties of the oceans were crucial to an understanding the CO2 cycle. The problem was
that of providing a detailed account of these properties. Revelle and Su¨ess advanced
matters here by suggesting two mechanisms through which the oceans process CO2. It is
interesting to note that the knowledge itself—especially that pertaining to the chemical
properties of the ocean—was not new. Weart (2007, 7; see also his 2003) points out that
the relevant reactions had been understood since the 1930s. Revelle himself was in an ideal
position to tackle this issue, since he had considerable knowledge of, and experience of
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research into, oceanic chemistry and the processes by which oceanic water mixes (Weart
2007, 3f; see also his 2003).
Very often, bilateral problem-feeding is about a cognitive division of labour. One
discipline or field takes on the issues of another, so that, ideally, the resolution of those
issues can be transmitted back. Darden and Maull’s (1977) idea of an ‘interfield theory’ is
relevant here. An interfield theory relates one discipline or field to another by postulating,
or establishing, an ontological connection between the domains of the respective disci-
plines or fields. Darden and Maull give four examples of ways in which disciplines or fields
can be connected: one discipline may provide the physical location, the physical nature, or
the structure of an entity (or process) postulated in another; or disciplines may be causally
linked (see Darden and Maull 1977, 49). These four kinds of connection are not mutually
exclusive.1
Interfield theories order fields ontologically, allowing for them to map onto each other.
For instance, cytology and transmission genetics are interconnected through the chromo-
some theory of Mendelian heredity. In genetics the gene was a postulated entity corre-
sponding to some phenotype that was inherited between generations (all-or-nothing).
Cytologists provided the physical location of the gene on the chromosomes and were thus
able to resolve certain issues within genetics. Thus the statistical deviation that had been
noticed could be explained by the fact that proximal genes were more likely to be inherited
together. Assortment is not perfectly random.
It is possible to recast Darden and Maull’s case as one of bilateral problem-feeding.
Transmission geneticists were in no position to investigate the physical location of the
gene, as such a task lay entirely outside the scope of the methods available to them. But
does this imply that the phenomenon of bilateral problem-feeding is already accounted for
in the literature? No, and below we argue that it is not.
Are interfield theories necessary or sufficient, or both, for bilateral problem-feeding to
ensue? Let us start with sufficiency. Suppose discipline A encounters problem P, where-
upon P is fed to discipline B, solved through solution S, and S is then fed back into A. For
this to happen it seems to us that S needs to be admissible in A. Two ways in which this
could be achieved come to mind. S might be, as it were, inherently admissible in A. For
instance, the process by which S was produced in B could be considered to be reliable, or
adequate, by standards generally applied in A. Alternatively, the relevant researchers in
A trust the ones in B regardless of what the process in B looks like. In neither case does the
presence of an interfield theory by itself suffice. In the first, the disciplinary fields are
proximate in the sense that they share epistemic standards and values beyond the interfield
theory that allow them to evaluate each other’s methods, tools and procedures. In the
second, the interfield theory needs to be supplemented by some kind of agreement
involving mutual trust. The boundaries may be ever so clear, but if the members of
discipline A simply do not trust members of discipline B to produce reliable results it will
1 In the present paper the focus is on interdisciplinarity and hence disciplines are centre stage. Darden and
Maull discuss fields. A field on, their conception is constituted by ‘‘a central problem, a domain consisting of
items taken to be facts related to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations
as to how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes, but not always, concepts,
laws and theories which are related to the problem and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals. A
special vocabulary is often associated with the characteristic elements of a field’’ (Darden and Maull 1977,
44). Following Darden and Maull’s own approach we will not make any particular distinction between fields
and disciplines; we will generally take them to be coextensive; at the very least we will assume that a
disciplinary boundary is also a field boundary (though perhaps not vice versa). Clearly, some would disagree
with this: Grantham (2004) and Bechtel (1986) for instance.
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not help. Sustainability science is plausibly a case in point. Although various interfield
theories linking social and economic phenomena to various natural phenomena (climate,
ecology, etc.) are at least partly in place, mutual distrust between the disciplines sometimes
hampers collaborations. The presence of an interfield theory is generally not sufficient for
bilateral problem-feeding to take place.
Is an interfield theory necessary for problem-feeding to take place? When it comes to
necessity the situation is somewhat different. This is largely because it is more difficult to
pinpoint Darden and Maull’s exact position on this matter. In order for discipline B to be
relevant to discipline A, and vice versa, some relation needs to be present. This is quite
simply what it means to be relevant. But interfield theories are not just some relation. In
fact, they are not even just some ontological relation. Interfield theories link the domains of
disciplines in highly specific ways. We can see two ways in which interdisciplinary linking
can happen that do not seem to fit the interfield theory model. First, disciplines can be
linked and exchange problems in ways other than by linking their respective domains. For
example, a discipline may encounter a theoretical or conceptual problem that is best
thought of as one concerning its methods, theories, concepts, and so on. Suppose this
problem is within the domain of that discipline, and suppose further that its solution
benefits the discipline of origin. Then we shall be linking the domain of one discipline with
some other aspect of another discipline. That does not seem to qualify as an interfield
theory, but clearly it could be a case of bilateral problem-feeding.
Second, disciplines can be linked more loosely—i.e. in a manner less explicit or specific
than happens in the case of interfield theories. Mitchell’s (2002, 2003, 2009) integrative
pluralism comes to mind. Mitchell discusses composite explanations of complex phe-
nomena, mainly within the life sciences. It is not unusual for explanations that seem to be
competing (because they are mistakenly conceived of as full explanations of an explan-
andum) to in fact be compatible and complementary (since they add different components
of the total cause). This might happen if they are integrated only at a certain level—the
level of concrete particulars. At their most general level, the theories cannot be integrated
to provide an account of the phenomenon in question because it is a phenomenon that has
many different causes and the causal profile of specific instances may vary a lot. Here the
ontological connection between the two disciplines is merely that the same phenomenon is
discussed, and that (different) causes of its occurrence are investigated. This is not the kind
of situation Darden and Maull have in mind, and it fails to qualify as an interfield theory.
However, the upshot of the encounter can be successful bilateral problem-feeding. It is
easy to conceive of situations in which partial explanations are contributed from various
sources as cases of problem-feeding. It seems, especially given the first point above, that
interfield theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for problem-feeding to obtain.
However, this does not prevent them from being crucially important where they do occur.
6 Barriers to Problem-Feeding, and Concept Coordination
At this point it should be added that the transference of problems between disciplines has
its obstacles.
First, there might be language barriers. The discipline of origin may formulate a
problem in such a way that it cannot be understood by those in the target discipline. This
might be especially visible in attempted, but failed, bilateral problem-feeding. For instance,
lawyers have to decide in matters where scientific expertise is prima facie relevant. It is not
uncommon for scientific experts to be consulted when, for instance, environmental risk
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management issues are being scrutinized—or when the causes of, and responsibility for, a
human injury are being assessed. However, attempts at bilateral problem-feeding from law
to science are not always successful in facilitating the lawyer’s decision. Wahlberg (2010)
reports the following expert’s experience:
All right, you ask us physicians, ‘What do you think?’, and we write that in this
particular case there are pathological changes; the changes are of such a kind that we
do not regard the injury as a consequence of an accident. But the courts have during
recent years always ruled in favour of the patient. I don’t mind that. But then why ask
us?
One reason successful bilateral problem-feeding from law to science is so difficult,
Wahlberg claims, is that understandings of causation in the two fields differ. The causal
concepts—or rather the ontologies corresponding to ‘causelaw’ and ‘causescience’—are only
superficially the same. For this reason it would arguably be inaccurate to say that in this
example just one obstacle, a language barrier, is the problem.2 But the deployment of the
term ‘cause’ in both fields is liable to give rise to misconceptions about the opportunities
for bilateral problem-feeding. A transfer or coordination of causal concepts, or of the way
in which we deploy causal terms, would facilitate this bilateral form of problem-feeding
substantially.
Similarly Maull (1977) once emphasised that there needs to be some sharing of ter-
minology if ‘problem shifts’ between disciplines, or disciplinary branches, are to take
place. Problem shifts exemplify a special kind of bilateral problem-feeding. We have
already touched on the example Maull deploys as an illustration: through a series of
scientific developments, beginning around 1910, the problem of understanding the physical
basis of heritable alterations shifted from genetics to biochemistry, where it was famously
solved in the 1950s. Maull (1977) claims that this problem shift was associated with a
transformation of the vocabulary in which the problem was formulated ensuring that this
vocabulary was ‘shared’ by the two disciplines:
Such a ‘shared’ vocabulary, it turns out, can be used to identify a very special sort of
problem, a problem that, although it arises within one branch of inquiry, can only be
solved with the aid of another science. (Maull 1977, 144)
Sometimes, Maull claims, vocabulary is transformed in order to make problem shifts
possible. ‘Mutation’ was first a proper term in genetics; it then referred to heritable
alteration of the genotype; but later it came to stand for heritable alteration in the base
sequence of DNA. This last change gave biochemists access to the expression. At the same
time problems raised by mutation became difficult to solve within genetics. Though
problems concerning the physical nature of the determinants of heredity arose within
genetics, genetics could not solve them. One reason was methodological. Genetics deploys
statistical methods and crossbreeding in order to establish regularities in heritable
characteristics. However, with the transformation of the term ‘mutation’, the problem
could shift across to biochemistry—where a solution was forthcoming. At other times,
vocabulary is simply imported. However, regardless of whether vocabulary is shared
because of a process of transformation (as in the mutation example) or because it has been
imported, the lack of shared vocabulary is often an obstacle to the transfer of problems.
2 Thus there are ontological barriers, too. At the end of Sect. 8 we refer to a methodological barrier as well.
Both these types of barrier can be even more important than terminological barriers.
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At least, this holds for explicit problem-feeding. Beyond this there are more implicit—
perhaps even tacit—varieties of problem-feeding as well. Although these may not offer
such fertile ground for philosophical discussion, they are perhaps more important than the
explicit kinds of problem-feeding from a scientific perspective. Hacking (1996, 70) quotes
a charming metaphor of James Clerk Maxwell’s which speaks of the ‘‘cross-fertilization of
the sciences’’. According to Maxwell, researchers are like honeybees, never thinking about
the importance of ‘‘the dust which they are carrying from flower to flower’’. Some prob-
lems are perhaps never formulated in the discipline of origin, but they are nevertheless
tacitly transferred to a target discipline.
Second, problems of the sort with which we are concerned can be more or less well
understood (Nickles 1981; Laudan 1977). This can arise in different ways, but one issue is
that scientists working in the discipline of origin sometimes have only a crude under-
standing of what is really constitutive of the problem they are successfully transferring (or
unsuccessfully trying to transfer) to another discipline. A problem is encountered in dis-
cipline A and identified as ‘belonging’ to some other discipline, B. This is the reason for
attempting problem-feeding. However, those working in discipline A may have unrealistic,
or plainly mistaken, ideas about the solutions that can be expected in B. In sustainability
science problems are frequently identified by natural scientists as belonging to a particular
social science. The findings of Lenton and colleagues generate many potentially relevant
problems that can be (unilaterally) transferred to the social sciences. Some of these are
easier to understand from the point of view of Lenton et al. than others. Thus one might
conjecture that the following two problems are rather easy to understand: What policies
should be implemented to prevent us from reaching a tipping point? What are the obstacles
to implementation of such policies? However, towards the end of their paper Lenton et al.
call for the identification of tipping elements within the socioeconomic system. This is a
much more complicated request. The attempted problem-feeding assumes that the
‘socioeconomic system’ can be described within the formal apparatus that produces tipping
elements. It is in order to ask whether they really understand the problem that they try to
transfer it.
7 Problem-Feeding, Methodological Complementarity, and Practical Unification
The idea of problem-feeding can usefully be connected with what Grantham (2004) calls
practical unification. By contrast, many philosophical accounts of integration and unifi-
cation within the sciences are founded on the idea of theoretical unification (or, as we saw
in the beginning, on the idea of coordination by a higher-level concept). Even though
Darden and Maull (1977) define a disciplinary field as something that only sometimes
includes theories, but always includes a number of other entities—central problems, tools,
methods, etc.—the actual unification they describe flows from theories about the ontologies
of the disciplinary fields in question. This is why there is reason to think of their account as
a modern variety of the traditional perspective on interdisciplinarity outlined in the
beginning of this paper. As Grantham points out, Kincaid (1990) also emphasises theo-
retical interconnections in his account of unification. Kincaid’s account is based on the idea
that various theories can relate to each other in a number of ways, and on the corresponding
idea that unification is—as it cannot be in the reductionist conception—a matter of degree.
The greater the number of relations present, the more unified are the theories in question.
Unity peaks when two theories are incorporated in an integrated interlevel theory—that is,
a theory that unifies
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…two disparate theories by employing explanations, confirmational procedures, etc.
invoking both levels, and by providing evidence that the events and entities of one
theory depend upon and are constituted from those of the other. (Kincaid 1990, 590)
Let us follow Grantham in referring to the interdisciplinary consequences of these sorts of
relation as theoretical unification, and let us distinguish this type of unification from
practical unification. Grantham sorts methodological interactions under the latter heading,
and argues that they play a more substantial role than is acknowledged in some of the
alleged examples of theoretical unification deployed by Kincaid (1990). Similarly, if we
return to Darden and Maull it seems true in their example, too, that practical unification is
of some importance. It was in virtue of the methods and tools at their disposal that
cytologists were able to conduct inquiries that were quite beyond the scope of any
statistical analysis of data on the occurrence of phenotypes across generations. The
interconnection between disciplines via methods appears to be important in both these
cases, and methodological complementarity is—partly, at least—what is motivating the
interdisciplinary encounters in them. Grantham argues that theoretical and practical
unification are to some extent independent. There can be considerable theoretical
unification without coordination of research practices, and there can be considerable
practical unification with only a low degree of theoretical unification (Grantham 2004, 15).
Moreover, methodological complementarity (rather than theoretical integration) seems
to be a necessary condition of bilateral problem-feeding—which suggests that problem-
feeding entails practical unification.
The association of problem-feeding with practical rather than theoretical unification fits
well with the picture we have been promoting in this paper. First, the theoretical inter-
connections that must be in place in order for problem-feeding to ensue can be compar-
atively weak. Some connection needs to be in place, but nothing as substantive as, say, an
interfield theory needs to exist. Second, and trivially, partial independence implies that
theoretical unification will not necessarily emerge with the advent of problem-feeding.
There may be interdisciplinarity as problem-feeding without traditional interdisciplinarity.
In connection with sustainability science such results may be informative for the kind of
unity that is required. Many sustainability scientists have identified integration and unifi-
cation as a core problem of sustainability science. How can we integrate the models of
social and natural sciences to form one, presumably cohesive, set? Maybe this ambition
overshoots the target. Given the practical nature of sustainability issues—after all the
research project bottoms out in tackling, or rather helping to tackle, problems the solutions
to which will always be judged by actual outcomes—it is perhaps perfectly in order to see
problem-solving, as opposed to other epistemic ideals, as the overriding aim. In this
approach theoretical and conceptual unification should primarily be sought only to the
extent that it is instrumental in solving these problems.
8 Problem-Feeding as a Driver of Concept and Method Coordination
We have already touched on Grantham’s view that unification increases with a rise in the
number (or variety) of ways in which two fields are connected. He also claims that
unification is enhanced by an increase in the significance of the connections that are
already in place. A connection becomes more significant if it begins to transform the
neighbouring field. That is, if the introduction of a novel concept, generalization,
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technique, or heuristic leads to considerable change in the absorbing field, then the change
is regarded as significant and unification is advanced (Grantham 2004, 144).
We have just claimed that there may be interdisciplinarity as problem-feeding without
traditional interdisciplinarity. But an argument in favour of the idea that problem-feeding is
especially important for interdisciplinarity should also provide reasons for thinking that
problem-feeding is significant in the sense that it might begin to transform the neigh-
bouring field.
We have claimed that sustainability science is an interdisciplinary field, and that the
disciplines involved in the exchange of problems are located either side of the natural/
social science divide. Sustainability science differs in many respects from the cases that
have caught the attention of the majority of philosophers of interdisciplinarity. Most
philosophical treatments concentrate on disciplinary fields that are in many respects
proximate. They share much at the outset, and this makes the sharing and shifting of
problems a lot smoother. Within sustainability science this is decidedly not the case—at
least, when it comes to integrating the natural and social dimensions of sustainability.
However, and this is our next point, this does not undermine the recognition that problems
need to be transferred.
Our suspicion is that the need to solve problems by first feeding them to another field is
sometimes itself the fundamental reason why other kinds of bridge between distinct dis-
ciplinary fields are created. We have already seen how this may generate changes in, or
transfers of, vocabulary in the example given by Maull (1977). She shows how the need to
problem-feed might result in shared vocabulary. Problem-feeding sometimes stimulates
concept coordination. A degree of conceptual transfer from A to B, or coordination
between them, normally results in the possibility that problems in B can be fed into and
(sometimes) solved in A. When this happens it would be misconceived to consider prob-
lem-feeding as the outcome of other forms of integration. Quite the contrary, it is the
starting point. It begins to transform the neighbouring field.
We would like to conclude this sketch of the ways in which problem-feeding can drive
other kinds of transfer or coordination by saying a few words about method transfer and
method coordination. Method transfer can occur in several ways. Methods can be migrated
domain-only-wise where a method already known within one discipline is deployed to
extract information from a domain to which it has not previously been applied. From
within the ranks of ecology there has been a degree of optimism about the power of the
methods used there. This transfer does not have to result in actual interdisciplinarity, since
the other field operating in the domain need not be influenced by it. However, disciplinary
method transfer can result in the migrating method out-competing the methods that were
previously in play. Two observations by Ronald Coase (see also Ma¨ki 2009) are interesting
in this context:
[I]n the long run it is the subject matter, the kind of question which the practitioners
are trying to answer, which tends to be the dominant factor producing the cohesive
force that makes a group of scholars a recognizable profession… However, in the
short run, the ability of a particular group in handling certain techniques of analysis,
or an approach, may give them such advantages that they are able to move suc-
cessfully into another field or even to dominate it. (Coase 1978, 204)
More often, perhaps, method transfer generates situations in which methods are somehow
used in concert. The transfer results in methodological pluralism. ‘Mixed methods’
research is one possible result. But the label ‘methodological pluralism’ collects several
distinct varieties of the type. Some problem-feeding events are such that several distinct
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methods are used more or less in sequence to solve various linked problems. At least one
non-sequential variety is similar: certain phenomena have multiple causes whose
investigation is carried out using different methods. A third kind of methodological
pluralism that might result from method transfer is illustrated by the use of multiple
methods to obtain results that are robust. In this case methodological pluralism involves the
use of a set of disparate methods to achieve an epistemic end: for example, solving a
particular problem complex (or chain), or checking results for robustness.
Disciplinary method transfer or coordination consorts well with our account of inter-
disciplinarity, especially since cases of such transfer or coordination do not always con-
stitute interdisciplinarity (unlike cases of transfer or coordination motivated by problem-
feeding concerns, which do). Simply sharing a certain method is not always sufficient for
interdisciplinarity, even if the method has migrated from the one field to another. For
instance, statistical analysis is widespread in both the natural and the social sciences.
However, this does not seem to warrant talk of interdisciplinarity. Why is this? Is it
because the migrating method is insufficiently anchored in the field from which it is being
transferred? This would be alarming news to those involved in the many unificationist
programmes being prosecuted today. Philosophers trying to facilitate the unification of
A and B would risk finding that the very fact that unification was provided by methods (or
concepts, or problems, or some such) suggested by a third party prevents interdisciplinarity
between A and B. The risk should not be exaggerated, of course; further developments
between A and B would stand a better chance of being truly interdisciplinary.
In our opinion the most interesting interdisciplinary cases of method transfer typically
centre on problem-solving processes. In an early contribution to the modern literature on
interdisciplinarity, Sherif and Sherif (1969) discuss a case that helps to bring this out:
Yet when Dr William Schottstaedt and his colleagues studied the detailed bio-
chemical and physiological records of patients in a metabolic ward, they found that
variations in these strictly physiological measures of metabolism were significantly
related to the vicissitudes of interpersonal relationships among patients, with nurses
and doctors, and with visitors. (Sherif and Sherif 1969, 6)
A little further on, the authors continue:
If we would start to inquire further why these particular patients were hospitalized
for metabolic disorders, and not others, we would find ourselves immediately in
problems requiring demographic study of different populations and in problems
requiring institutional analysis of admittance procedures and financing; and these
might very well lead us to problems of the political and economic systems in which
the institutions functions (ibid.).
In pursuing the problems that arise from this observation Dr Schottstaedt and his
colleagues would have ventured beyond their immediate expertise. This could happen in at
least two ways. One is simply to import the methods and approaches necessary to address
the questions one might have. As Sherif and Sherif seem to imply, however, this might be
quite untenable in the long run. Prima facie it would be more rational to engage in
problem-feeding and export the problem to a discipline where the methods and tools are
readily available. Problem-feeding does not always result in method transfer. Sometimes
we can either export the problem or import the know-how (the method, in this case). Doing
one of the two is enough. What problem-feeding does require, minimally, is that some
methodological coordination takes place. (To the extent that this has not been settled a
problematic methodological barrier is in place.)
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9 Conclusion: The Basic Evolutionary Ladder Revisited
We have argued that problem-feeding is a salient type of interdisciplinary collaboration in
sustainability science. We have also argued that it cannot be accounted for by the tradi-
tional perspective, since it does not necessarily involve coordination by higher level
concept. We have placed problem-feeding in context of recent discussion, particularly the
work of authors like Grantham, Kincaid, Mitchell, Darden, and Maull.
The interdisciplinarity resulting from problem-feeding between researchers can be local
and temporary and does not require collaboration between proximate disciplines. By
contrast, to make good sense of traditional integrative interdisciplinarity we must arguably
associate it with a longer-term, global form of close, interdisciplinary collaboration.
Furthermore, whether or not one believes in the interdisciplinary evolutionary ladder
(Jantsch 1970/1972, 15) it seems to us that a basic step can consist of problem-feeding.
This can occur where interdisciplinarity starts to evolve. The step is not a prerequisite of
reaching further steps of the traditional ladder, such as coordination by ‘‘higher-order
concept’’ or method. Such coordination may be secured by an alternative route, for dif-
ferent reasons. In this sense we are pluralists. But it is clear that a preference for bilateral
problem-feeding—especially—may trigger the coordination of concepts and methods.
Problem-feeding already introduces the sense of purpose the traditional perspective locates
at more advanced steps of the interdisciplinary ladder. Jantsch, for one, thought that a sense
of purpose was introduced when a common axiomatics for a group of related disciplines
was defined at the next higher hierarchical level (Jantsch 1970/1972, 16).
It appears to us that the very fact that the sense of purpose is introduced so early on in
interdisciplinarity as problem-feeding yields more opportunities for local interdisciplinarity,
i.e. interdisciplinary encounters motivated by a local problem. Perhaps several cases that
have been thought of as Mode 2 (Gibbons et al. 1994) can be reformulated as cases of this
type. However, we are not suggesting the two conceptions are inter-translatable. Indeed
there is an important difference between them. Gibbons et al. (1994, 29) talk about Mode 2
as something requiring a ‘‘homogenised theory or model pool’’. But problem-feeding does
not presuppose a homogenised theory or model pool, and we have argued in the paper that
unilateral problem-feeding does not require anything like that either. Successful bilateral
problem-feeding requires more coordination, but there is still a significant difference.
Acknowledgments We want to thank Lennart Olsson, Paul Robinson, Cecilia and Jep Agrell, Stefan
Schubert, and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for a number of constructive comments on an earlier
version of this manuscript. This work was supported by the Linnaeus programme LUCID (‘‘Lund University
Centre of Excellence for Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability’’ (www.lucid.lu.se/),
FORMAS, 2008–2018). An early forerunner of the text was presented at the Third Biennial Conference of
the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (June 22–24, 2011; Exeter, UK) and has been published on
Phil Sci Archive as: Thore´n, Henrik and Persson, Johannes (2011) Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity:
Problem-Feeding, Conceptual Drift, and Methodological Migration. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8670/.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
References
Apostel, L., Berger, G., Briggs, A., & Michaud, G. (Eds.). (1972). Interdisciplinarity: Problems of teaching
and research in universities. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
354 H. Thore´n, J. Persson
123
Arrhenius, S. (1896). On the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the temperature of the ground.
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 41, 237–276.
Bechtel, W. (1986). The nature of scientific integration. In W. Bechtel (Ed.), Integrating scientific disci-
plines (pp. 3–52). Dordrecht: Nijhoff.
Bolin, B., & Eriksson, E. (1959). Changes in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere and sea due to
fossil fuel combustion. In B. Bolin, (Ed.), The atmosphere and the sea in motion (pp. 130–142).
New York: The Rockefeller Institute and Oxford University Press.
Coase, R. (1978). Economics and contiguous disciplines. Journal of Legal Studies, 7, 201–211.
Craig, H. (1957). The natural distribution of radiocarbon and the exchange time of carbon dioxide between
atmosphere and sea. Tellus, 9, 1–17.
Darden, L., & Maull, N. (1977). Interfield theories. Philosophy of Science, 44, 43–64.
Edlund, C., Hermere´n, G., & Nilstun, T. (1986). Tva¨rskap. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The New Pro-
duction of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London:
Sage.
Grantham, T. (2004). Conceptualizing the (dis)unity of science. Philosophy of Science, 71, 133–155.
Hacking, I. (1996). The disunities of the sciences. In P. Galison & D. J. Stump (Eds.), The disunity of science
(pp. 37–74). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Jantsch, E. (1970/1972). Inter- and transdisciplinary university: A systems approach to education and
innovation. (Originally published in Policy Sciences 1970). Higher Education, 1, 7–37.
Jerneck, A., et al. (2011). Structuring sustainability science. Sustainability Science, 6, 69–82.
Kincaid, H. (1990). Molecular biology and the unity of science. Philosophy of Science, 57, 575–593.
Klein, J. T. (1990). Interdisciplinarity. History, theory and practice. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1969/1970). ‘Postscript’. In His: The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley, Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Lenton, T., Held, H., Kriegler, E., Hall, J., Lucht, W., Rahmstorf, S., et al. (2008). Tipping elements in the
earth’s climate system. PNAS, 105, 1786–1793.
Ma¨ki, U. (2009). Economics imperialism: Concept and constraints. Philosophy of the social sciences, 39,
351–380.
Maull, N. (1977). Unifying science without reduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 8,
143–162.
Mitchell, S. D. (2002). Integrative pluralism. Biology and Philosophy, 17, 55–70.
Mitchell, S. D. (2003). Biological complexity and integrative pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Mitchell, S. D. (2009). Unsimple truths: Science, complexity, and policy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. London: Routledge.
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine. (2005).
Facilitating interdisciplinary research. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Nickles, T. (1981). What is a problem that we may solve it? Synthese, 47, 85–118.
Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2001). Rethinking science: Knowledge and the public in an age of
uncertainty. London: Sage.
Persson, J., & Sahlin, N.-E. (2013). Vetenskapsteori fo¨r sanningsso¨kare. Stockholm: Fri Tanke Bokfo¨rlag.
Revelle, R., & Su¨ess, H. (1957). Carbon dioxide exchange between atmosphere and ocean and the question
of an increase of atmospheric CO2 during the past decades. Tellus, 9, 18–27.
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. (Eds.). (1969). Interdisciplinary relationships in the social sciences. Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company.
Thore´n, H., & Persson, J. (2011). Philosophy of interdisciplinarity: Problem feeding, conceptual drift, and
methodological migration. PhilSci-Archive. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8670/.
Wahlberg, L. (2010). Legal questions and scientific answers: Ontological differences and epistemic gaps in
the assessment of causal relations. Ph.D. thesis, Lund University.
Weart, S. (1997). Global warming, cold war, and the evolution of research plans. Historical Studies in the
Physical and biological Sciences, 27, 319–356.
Weart, S. (2003). The discovery of global warming. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Weart, S. (2007). Roger Revelle’s discovery. American Institute of Physics. http://www.aip.org/history/
climate/pdf/Revelle.pdf. Accessed 17 May 2011.
The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity 355
123
